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Introduction
The attainment of the water and sanitation MDGs is unlikely 
in the majority of African countries – the stability, invest-
ment and capacity needed to meet significant and growing 
demand is lacking.  But even if additional finance became 
available, the unacceptable level of leakage of existing re-
sources brings into question current processes and perhaps 
the wisdom of increasing resource flows to the sector. Much 
of the funding available in ministries, local governments, 
utilities and village administrations is being used by public 
office for private gain (World Bank, 1997).
Understanding corruption in the WSS sector
Corruption can generally be understood in terms of: bureau-
cratic or petty corruption in which a vast number of officials 
abusing public office extract small bribes and favours; grand 
corruption meaning the use of vast amounts of sector funds 
by a relative small number of officials; or state capture 
seen in the collusion between public and private actors for 
private benefit (Schacter and Shah, 2000). In WSS, these 
corrupt practices, big and small, take the form of: (i) abuse 
of resources – theft and embezzlement from budgets and 
revenues, (ii) corruption in procurement which results in 
overpayment and failure to enforce quality standards, (iii) 
administrative corruption in payment systems, and (iv) cor-
ruption at the point of service delivery. 
This corruption varies substantially in size and incidence, 
but it is likely that somewhere in the region of 20-40% of 
WSS sector finances is being lost to those tasked with the 
decision-making and delivery of water and sanitation services 
(Davis, 2003; World Bank, 2003). This scale is significant. 
If the estimated 6.7 billion USD needed to reach the MDGs 
in sub-Saharan Africa was mobilized annually, a 30% leak-
age would represent a loss of over 20 billion USD from the 
sector over the next decade.1
Although data is weak, evidence suggests that corruption 
in the WSS sector varies by system, by country (and sub-re-
gions), by governance and a multitude of other factors.  The 
type, size and incidence of corruption in service delivery may 
be a function of the path of legislative reform, the nature of 
the water market, or the way the sector has been managed, or 
it may be an outcome of decentralization, the role of social 
structures and civil society. In rural and peri-urban areas, 
the highly opaque construction and management processes, 
the remote, unmonitored and low capacity contexts, and the 
lack of competition, all potentially contribute to local level 
corruption, capture and collusion. 
Who is involved?  WSS sector corruption involves, to some 
degree, a vast range of stakeholders.  The list of actors includes 
international actors (both donor representatives and private 
companies and multinationals), international, national and 
local construction companies, consultancy firms and suppli-
ers, large and small-scale operators, a range of middlemen, 
consumers and CSOs as well as national and sub-national 
politicians, and all grades of civil servants and utility staff. 
Corrupt activities between these partners occur at a range of 
institutional levels, with different stakeholders often involved 
in more than one type of corrupt transaction.
What are the causes?  Like all corruption in developing 
and transitional economies, corruption in WSS in Africa is 
founded in historical, political and social realities, the causes 
of corruption are not sectoral.  Corrupt practices take hold 
For the past three decades a substantial number of governments, donors and NGOs have focused efforts on a range of 
institutional, financial, technical and social interventions aimed at bringing about much-needed improvements in the 
delivery of water and sanitation services in rural and urban areas of Africa. Largely absent from these efforts has been 
a serious attempt to tackle the corruption that occurs in a wide range of sector transactions. The purpose of this paper 
is to promote more comprehensive understanding of sector corruption and potential anti-corruption mechanisms among 
a broad audience of WSS stakeholders. The paper describes the plural nature of corruption in water and sanitation by 
setting out in a structured framework the network of corrupt practices prevalent in the sector. Emphasising the need for 
better diagnostics, the paper cautiously suggests that the most promising models for anti-corruption sector reform in the 
African continent appear to lie in the development of greater transparency and accountability mechanisms – supported 
by ongoing efforts in WSS sector reform
Refereed Paper
PLUMMER and CROSS
568
and are manifest in different contexts in very different ways 
and legal frameworks, institutional structures and bureau-
cratic systems strongly influence how elected, managerial 
and technical officials behave.  Klitgaard’s definition of 
corruption: 
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability, 
(Klitgaard, 1998) is very relevant to an understanding of the 
WSS sector in Africa in that it highlights the aggregate effect 
of monopoly and discretionary power.  The WSS sector has 
long grappled with its monopolistic past and the traits (such 
as high capital costs and economies of scale) that tend to keep 
it that way.  A strong characteristic of agencies and officials 
involved in the sector is their enormous discretion in the plan-
ning, design, contracting, implementation and monitoring of 
water and sanitation service delivery (compounded by a lack 
of clarity of rules and regulations). Yet public officials at all 
levels shoulder a range of responsibilities and must meet the 
obligations that come with their position (Burgess, 2006). 
To this it must be added that demand for accountability for 
services, although improving in many contexts, is typically 
a missing element in service-provider and water-user rela-
tionships in Africa (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998).
Is the water sector prone to corruption?  It is difficult not to 
follow the lead of other sectors and emphasize the enormity 
of the problem of WSS sector corruption. While we know 
it is significant however, we do not currently know if the 
WSS sector is more or less prone to corruption, or whether 
such a generalization could be made when we know country 
contexts, institutions and policies vary so greatly. Neverthe-
less it is possible to posit a number of characteristics which 
make WSS services susceptible and a cause for grave con-
cern for all stakeholders. Many of the fundamental issues, 
such as low capacity, low wages, dysfunctional institutions, 
and large-scale procurement are common to public service 
delivery, but the WSS sector is a part of the construction 
sector, globally thought to be the most corrupt of all sectors 
(TI, 2005), and it does aggregate a number of other dimen-
sions which suggest relatively high potential for corruption. 
These include, inter alia, (i) the large flow of public money, 
often uncoordinated donor, national and local funds, (ii) the 
opacity, political interference and discretion in investment 
decisions, (iii) the monopolistic nature of service delivery, 
coupled with the failure of sector financing and cost recovery, 
problematic tariffs and subsidies, and the increasing role 
of the informal market, (iv) the cost of sector assets, v) the 
asymmetry of information between user and provider, and 
(vi) the complexity of sector stakeholders, systems, levels 
of service, institutional roles and functions.  
How much is corruption costing the WSS sector? Hypoth-
eses on the scope and incidence of corruption in the WSS 
sector are largely untested. Leakage can be roughly estimated 
through comparative and limited sector studies, but to date 
it has not been measured in the WSS sector in Africa in any 
systematic way. As a proportion of sector expenditure, the 
high levels of petty corruption, in the aggregate, constitute 
a substantial figure across the continent, but we do not yet 
have regional or country estimates based on empirical studies. 
The figure of 20-35% provided by Davis in the context of 
the service delivery in South Asia (Davis, 2003), provides a 
sector not a regional indication, but it should be noted that 
this estimate is limited to petty corruption and does not ac-
count for high level abuse or diversion of resources.
Promoting a comprehensive view of corruption 
This purpose of this paper is to set out a comprehensive 
framework to unbundle and differentiate the various types 
of sector corruption. This framework can be used to tell us 
what corrupt practices exist, who is involved, and at what 
level they occur. It can be also used in each country context to 
locate the areas of corruption concentration, to plot shifts in 
corruption activity, and thus identify linkages in the corrup-
tion network. Ultimately the goal of this sort of information 
organizing exercise is to provide a robust framework that is 
relevant and applicable to the sector, integrates project level 
and cross-cutting governance diagnostics and is useable as 
a tool for understanding and promoting change. 
The corruption framework (see table 1) is structured around 
interactions.  This approach is driven by a need to engage 
with and build broad stakeholder commitment, and a strong 
belief that the problem should be articulated in terms of the 
actions of all public, private and civil society actors be they 
in demand or supply side roles. Beginning with the definition 
of corruption as the use of public office for private gain, the 
approach places the public office at the core of the interac-
tion framework and notes that the public officer/agency will 
interact with one of three different types of actors: (i) other 
public actors/agencies, (ii) private actors/companies, or (iii) 
consumers/civil society. 
I.   Public to public interactions
Corrupt practices in water and sanitation service delivery 
occur within the government itself (irrespective of consumers 
or private actors), through a series of interactions pertaining 
to policy, budgeting and programming, regulation, imple-
mentation, operation and maintenance, and monitoring. The 
‘public’ actor or government is made up of a range of actors 
from international, national and sub-national departments 
and agencies in both water and non-water (but influential) 
functions. 
Grand corruption occurs among politicians and senior of-
ficials in the selection of WSS projects: capital-investment 
projects are favored over lower investment alternatives, 
sector investments that guarantee higher levels of return, 
are favored over those that do not.  Public resources are 
diverted to WSS projects where there are greater levels of 
potential kickbacks, with the greatest incidence, at the low-
est possible risk.  Experience suggests that these are, more 
often than not, regressive in their impact. Sourcing water 
from surface rather than ground water alternatives (where 
available) is a typical illustration of decision-making that, 
while legal, creates opportunities for both grand and petty 
corruption. The need for the construction of costly water 
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treatment plants and ongoing procurement of chemicals, 
(and thus opportunity for recurrent bribery, extortion and 
fraud) such as that seen in Kinshasa, is characteristic of the 
types of decisions made within the water sector that have 
structural effects on corruption (Doyen, 2006).
Corrupt practices within government, typically involve 
interactions between public actors (although it may, in rare 
cases, be achieved by an individual alone).  These interac-
tions are ‘vertical’, within the hierarchy of water institutions, 
and/or ‘horizontal’ involving various line departments and 
agencies at a similar level of government. At the higher 
levels of government, corruption is opaque and complex, but 
distortions in the allocation of resources are only achieved 
by collaboration within water departments and between line 
departments such as Finance, Planning and Water Affairs. 
Officials are expected to ‘play the game’ and their status 
and power base is dependent on their willingness to work 
within the established system.
These vertical (or hierarchical) government interactions 
frequently concern personnel management:  bribes for ap-
pointments, transfers, or a multitude of perks.  Buying senior 
appointments is standard practice throughout the region and 
the prices paid for utility directorships or municipal engi-
neers are often common knowledge and calculable, based 
on sector norms. Many argue that these types of practices, 
common throughout the civil service, lie at the core of the 
incentive and patronage system and propagate other forms 
of corruption. Or corrupt practices might be focused on 
the use and abuse of resources, obtained by manipulating 
budgets and other questionable financial management prac-
tices. This practice is exacerbated by a disconnect between 
policy objectives, planning and implementation.  At the 
delivery agency and village level, this type of corruption 
might involve the diversion of the inputs themselves  (e.g. 
chemicals) for resale or other use – all resulting in lower 
quality or quantity of water supply.
Public to public interactions might also include the collu-
sion between government officials and international donor 
representatives. International donors are under pressure to 
disperse loans or grants, and to maintain relationships. In 
the water sector, this can lead to an emphasis on quantity 
over quality, and speed over specification.  Furthermore, 
donor representatives, like all employees, have incentives 
to deliver and to be seen to be managing successful projects 
delivered on time and cost.  On the government side, donor-
funding channels large flows through inadequate financial 
management systems, often dwarfing annual budgets and the 
capacity of recipient departments, utilities or district offices. 
Funding also includes for allowances that have a multitude of 
perverse personnel management effects, giving more senior 
public officials discretion to top up staff salaries by an order 
of magnitude and developing unhealthy incentive structures 
and relationships within recipient agencies. 
II.   Public to private interactions
Procurement, requiring the interaction between the public 
and private sectors, is the most publicized face of corruption. 
Every level of government, and every type of government 
agency has to purchase goods and services, normally from 
the private sector. In WSS, a number of public actors may 
be involved depending on the size and type of project: 
national and local government politicians and managers, 
municipal engineers, operations staff, project managers, 
procurement officers, and a set of private actors that might 
include suppliers, contractors operators and/or local and 
national consultants.  On large loans and projects it may also 
involve the collusion of donors seeking preferable terms for 
donor-country firms or operators.
It is a norm of economic life for private actors to seek 
to reduce competition, and is commonplace in the WSS 
sector at all levels – it is clear that the supply chain creates 
a number of concentrated opportunities for private gain. 
Bribery in relation to public procurement seeks to influence 
the selection of contracts for WSS services and supplies, 
payment schedules, profit margins and the outcomes of the 
regulatory process. In urban water supply, much of the at-
tention on public-private interactions has inevitably focused 
on transactions for WSS operations. The practice of working 
out ‘privatizations in private’ created unworkable agreements 
in Africa, muddied incentive structures and undermined the 
possible benefits of reform attained through private sector 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Bribery in public procurement is well described elsewhere 
(Transparency International, 2005). It typically occurs: 
• Before WSS contracts are awarded, high level officials 
can influence the way a contract is let, determining the nature 
of the project (e.g. higher investment projects), and then the 
contract (e.g. DBL, concessions, bundled services, franchise 
service area). Purchasing officials of a utility, municipality 
or district office then tailor specifications to suit favorite 
suppliers.
• During tendering corrupt practices restrict /provide in-
formation about contracting opportunities, create excuses 
for sole sourcing or uncompetitive selection, breach confi-
dentiality or disqualify suppliers and accept/ solicit bribes 
to influence tender lists or selection procedures. It is also 
common for private suppliers, consultants and contractors 
to collude among themselves to set prices, take turns in bid-
winning or to mark up pricing.  In many such situations this, 
like the falsification of records, is known to the procuring 
official who turns a blind eye in return for a kick-back. 
• After contracts are awarded, bribery and fraud is similar 
to other parts of the construction sector.  Supervising offi-
cials are bribed to agree to falsified claims and/or accounts, 
to facilitate the speedy approval of payments; or regulators 
and oversight officials are bribed to turn a blind-eye when 
specifications are not adhered to. Typically these practices 
help contractors minimize costs and result in sub-standard 
works, affecting sustainability and safety. 
A second set of corrupt interactions occur in the water 
market between public (local government and utility) officials 
and small private providers of water. Investigation into the 
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actions of small private water providers in squatter settlements 
reveal that their ability to function is often dependent on the 
deals they do with local officials. In squatter settlements in 
Nairobi for instance, legal water kiosk operators reported 
they struggle with inconsistent, irregular billing (Plummer, 
Mehrotra and Collignon, 2005).  Legal operators bribe of-
ficials to obtain more reliable and longer daily bulk supply, 
while those functioning illegally pay officials to connect into 
the network or deliver bulk water that they then distribute 
in a competitive market. In the sanitation sector, small-scale 
private operators pay local government officials to allow 
them to dump waste on inappropriate sites, with health and 
environmental consequences.
III.   Public to consumer/civil society interactions
Corrupt interactions between consumers and public officials, 
mostly in the form of bribery, are a wholly different matter. 
For the briber – the consumer – water is the desired outcome, 
and the incentive is to obtain a much-needed basic service. 
The corrupt interactions that take place between public water 
sector officials and poor water consumers are petty, frequent 
and systemic (they may be either extortive or collaborative). 
Common corrupt practices at the point of service delivery, 
include for instance, officials providing illegal connections, 
using utility water for resale in utility vehicles, or offering 
preferential treatment for repairs or new services. 
Other common public-consumer interactions concern 
administrative corruption over payment systems – falsifying 
meter reading, or avoiding officials over-charging. Typically 
where poor consumers are involved, the bribe is demanded 
rather than offered.  Most of these services result in com-
mercial leakage adding to the inefficiencies of dysfunctional 
agencies. In surveys conducted in Mozambique (World Bank 
Institute, undated) 12% of households reported that it was 
always necessary to bribe officials for services, over 20% 
of user-enterprises reported that they paid bribes in over 
25% of transactions, and almost half reported that it made 
no difference which official was involved – the need for 
bribes was the same (suggesting an institutional problem 
not a corrupt employee).
In rural areas, corruption affects the delivery of commu-
nity-based and NGO supported water supply and sanitation 
projects in their design, implementation and ongoing main-
tenance.  Although there is a lack of systematic assessment 
in Africa, collusion between village leaders and govern-
ment overseers in ways that detrimentally affect the poor 
are frequently visible. In the initial stage of projects, for 
instance, it is common to see design decisions (e.g. location 
of pumps) benefiting the elite. In implementation, efforts to 
increase profit reflect typical public-private procurement and 
construction fraud and bribery described above (e.g. theft 
of materials, not building to specification), and in project 
management it involves fraudulent documentation, account-
ing and reporting by those tasked with managing finances. 
The cost of rural boreholes in Africa is considered by many 
to be a prime hotspot for further investigation.
In urban areas, community-based WSS projects suffer 
from similar patterns of behavior, distorting the type of 
installation selected, and ongoing management.  Where the 
poor are served by utilities, they frequently pay bribes to 
officials to obtain access to services household connections 
and/or repairs off the utility-books, (and sewage disposal 
services).  In squatter areas, the level of the bribe may be 
pitched at a level the poor can afford and thus becomes part 
of the cost of accessing services (and some poor households 
will be able to afford it better than others). In other situations 
where the poor live in mixed-income settlements, and the 
water market is differentiated, higher-income households 
are prepared to pay more and the bribe is likely to be higher, 
marginalizing the poor and placing them at the end of the 
queue (Collignon, 2005).
This corruption however is part of a series of failures 
(weak policies and institutions) that create a lack of services 
and inevitably create a market for corruption at the point of 
service delivery.  It is vital that this corruption be viewed as 
a part of a system, it is far more complex than the picture of 
officials forcing consumers to pay bribes to obtain a serv-
ice normally free of charge. Where there is no alternative 
supply (and especially where small private providers have 
not developed an informal supply market), it is common 
that poor and non-poor households create the demand for 
‘corrupt water’.  They need the officials to provide corrupt 
water.  Similar to costly ‘informal’ water, corrupt water fills 
a gap created by ineffective agencies. In these cases corrupt 
officials, acting as informal providers, provide the poor 
with services they may not have otherwise obtained.  This 
presents the sector with a dilemma, at least in the short-term, 
that needs to be carefully managed to ensure the poor have 
ongoing access to water. 
Tackling corruption
This section on anti-corruption interventions aims to briefly 
consider the array of instruments for tackling corruption and 
to position these in relation to the WSS corruption interac-
tion framework.
• Tackling corruption occurring within 
government (public-public interactions)
Corrupt interactions internal to the public sector – within 
or between government tiers, departments, WSS agencies 
and individuals – have generally been addressed through 
indirect initiatives aimed at civil service reform and have 
been carried into the African water institutions to varying 
degrees.  It is not clear the extent to which these have been 
successful in combating corruption, but action has focused 
on reforming:
(i) WSS sector restructuring and organizational change 
(openness to leveraging private sector and other local 
stakeholder involvement, sector coordination as well as 
civil service size, leadership, competition, separation of 
policy, regulation and implementation) 
(ii) Personnel management (pay structures, promotions/ 
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appointments, recruitment, transfers, results-based 
management, terms and conditions, enforcement and 
sanctions) 
(iii) WSS financial management (financial policies and 
ring-fencing for viability, cost recovery and improvements 
in metering, billing and collection, as well as oversight, 
reporting, auditing processes).
This vision of sector reform is limited by the mandate of 
sector agencies.  In practice, a hierarchy of officials from 
a ladder of agencies interact with each other – within and 
outside water agencies – and in many countries it will be 
futile to build capacity and accountability in service delivery 
agencies (utilities, district administrations and village water 
committees) without also tackling higher levels of govern-
ment, or local government owners and decision-makers. 
Similarly it may be unproductive to work on developing 
accountability in a Ministry of Water, without the implicit 
agreement or participation of political leaders and the Min-
istry of Finance.
• Tackling corruption between government and private 
individuals / firms 
The private sector, in its supply, construction and operat-
ing roles, is a key actor in the determination of corruption 
outcomes in the WSS sector and cleaning up the interface 
between the public and private sectors is paramount to af-
fecting change. Corrupt interactions between government 
and private sector companies have been addressed through 
efforts to strengthen the enabling environment, and through 
specific mechanisms with public and private actors to ad-
dress corruption in public procurement, construction and 
operations.
Efforts in government have focused on prescriptive im-
provements to procurement environments – introducing 
anti-corruption laws, charters, performance standards, and 
establishing rules, principles and practices dictating procure-
ment procedures and auditing. Ideally this would mean that 
at the point of contact between the private sector and public 
officials, especially in relation to tender procedures and 
evaluations, procurement was more transparent, project and 
construction management and procurement staff were work-
ing at a new level of professionalism, with less discretion, 
actions were overseen and sanctions enforced if necessary. 
By in practice, addressing procurement weaknesses often 
takes a great deal of time to be resolved. 
Initiatives with multi-national companies and national 
companies operating in developing countries have mostly 
focused on achieving a greater level of integrity and profes-
sionalism among members through professional associa-
tions, codes of conduct, monitoring and benchmarking, and 
integrity pacts. Transparency International has spearheaded 
efforts to establish minimum standards for public contracting. 
The World Economic Forum PACI initiative, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, and construction-industry 
initiatives in the UK and Europe, seek to improve integrity 
in private companies, national governments and construc-
tion companies respectively. Although it forms a relatively 
small segment of the WSS sector in Africa, it is important 
to include the lessons that private sector operators provide. 
Lessons from Cote d’Ivoire for instance suggest that the 
delegation of operations to SODECI in the late 1980s led 
to a shift in the focus of investment (from capital intensive 
production units) to the rapid extension of distribution net-
works; the  shift to 100% cost recovery; from public-private 
deal-making to commercial procedures (and significant 
metering, billing and collection improvements) designed to 
discourage utility staff and customer corrupt interactions; 
the femalization of accounts positions; and far reduced 
unaccounted-for-water.  
Efforts ‘at the interface’ between local private providers 
and those operators responsible for city wide service delivery 
have started emerging in different forms in many cities in 
Africa and are central to developing more effective and ef-
ficient linkages between public and local private water sector 
actors.  Efforts to form associations of suppliers, develop 
constitutions and mechanisms for dialogue, formal bulk 
supply and other technological solutions that result in better 
bulk supply for the providers (and revenue for the utility), 
and competitive tender processes for area franchises, all 
formalize the interface with utilities and municipal water 
departments, and create more predictable environments 
for water businesses to flourish (Plummer, Collignon and 
Mehrotra, 2005). The local private sector is also the home of 
the middle-men that facilitate bribes between multi-nation-
als/national companies and governments – much greater focus 
is needed on understanding and developing the integrity of 
the local private sector.
• Tackling corrupt interactions between public officials 
and consumers / civil society
To date, anti-corruption mechanisms tackling corrupt inter-
actions at the point of service delivery have largely focused 
on improving the efficiency of the utility or delivery agency. 
The sector has long been aware of the various types of cor-
ruption that occur ‘at the tap’. The problem of illegal con-
nections has been addressed through efficiency drives or, in 
more innovative situations, legitimization programs, while 
a focus on improved meter-reading, billing and collection, 
has implicitly addressed some of the leakage that occurs 
through payment systems.
More recently, water governance efforts have aimed to 
stimulate accountability of service providers.  On the con-
sumer side, the important work on report cards developed 
by the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore, has been applied 
to the WSS sector in the WSP-supported initiative develop-
ing consumer report cards on water and sanitation services 
in Nairobi, Mombassa and Kisumu in Kenya.  Still in the 
development stage, this initiative is aimed at empowering 
households, be they poor and non-poor, to monitor the util-
ity services delivered to them. A critical aspect however is 
the existence or development of an effective complaints 
redressal system.  At a broader level, corruption surveys 
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such as those conducted by WBI, have often included util-
ity or municipal service delivery, and have provided some 
insights into community perceptions of bribery between 
officials and consumers. These are invaluable inputs for 
policy-makers.
A focus on utility-consumer interactions will however be 
limited in direct impact – only 30 percent of the population 
is directly served by utilities, and few of these are poor. 
Community-based WSS delivery systems, the preferred 
donor approach to WSS service provision, has escaped the 
attention of sector efficiency drives and has been bypassed 
in the debate over sector corruption.  This model of WSS 
service delivery has suffered from a somewhat naive as-
sumption that community involvement will, by definition, 
produce accountable and efficient outcomes. Investigation 
into community-managed rural development programs with 
sizeable WSS components have, however, uncovered that 
community management often results in high levels of cor-
ruption.  Poorly paid public officials frequently act in a non-
transparent and unaccountable manner, collude with project 
overseers, contractors and suppliers, and engage in a range 
of practices regarding procurement, construction, payment, 
as well as decisions which distort project benefits.  
Conclusion 
A key factor to recognize in taking forward an anti-cor-
ruption agenda in the water and sanitation sector is that 
most of what is being done now in the water governance 
agenda (policy, institutional, financial management reform, 
reducing inefficiencies, and demand-side capacity building) 
is central to anti-corruption activity.  But these efforts have 
not yet structurally shifted corrupt practices in the sector. 
It is therefore urgent to understand what shift is needed to 
recharge these efforts and focus them more effectively on 
tackling corruption. 
This paper has described, through a framework of corrupt 
interactions between public, private and consumer/civil so-
ciety actors/agencies, the various types of corruption that are 
prevalent in the WSS sector.  Understanding the network of 
corrupt activity, and identifying the areas of concentration 
of corruption within this larger framework is critical to ef-
fective policy making and strategy development.  Overlaid 
on this matrix of corrupt interactions, the paper has set out 
the many and varied anti-corruption mechanisms, including 
those that are generic and create an environment that deters 
or mitigates against the risk of corruption, and those that 
target specific types of anti-corruption activity.  
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